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INTRODUCTION 
On an unseasonably cold evening in southern Texas, Leslie Chew 
had trouble sleeping in the car that he called home.1  After finally 
deciding that he needed something to keep warm, Mr. Chew entered 
a store with no money and a bad plan.  Shortly after, Mr. Chew was 
arrested for attempting to steal four thirty-dollar blankets.2  Later that 
night, a judge set bail at $3500 for Mr. Chew.3  One hundred eighty-
five nights later, Mr. Chew was still incarcerated.4 
Mr. Chew did not spend six months in jail because he was found 
guilty of petit larceny.  Instead, Mr. Chew was confined to a cell 
because he could not afford to pay either a $3500 cash deposit to the 
court or a nonrefundable $350 fee to a bail bondsman.5  As a result, 
 
 1. Laura Sullivan, Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed With Inmates, NPR 
(Jan. 21, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2010/01/21/122725771/Bail-Burden-
Keeps-U-S-Jails-Stuffed-With-Inmates. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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Mr. Chew remained in Lubbock County Jail until he ultimately 
received and accepted a plea from the prosecution.6 
Similarly, Carol Brown was recently arrested in Brooklyn when a 
police officer claimed that he saw her drop a crack pipe.7  When bail 
was set at $1000, Ms. Brown realized it would be impossible for her to 
come up with the money.8  Although the case was eventually 
dismissed after a lab test revealed that there was no drug residue on 
the pipe, Ms. Brown had already spent twelve days incarcerated, eight 
of which were on Rikers Island.9 
Meanwhile, a wealthy attorney in Seattle accused of raping several 
massage therapists was able to preserve his liberty after posting the 
requisite one-million-dollar bail.10  Even the much-maligned George 
Zimmerman was not detained before being tried for allegedly 
murdering Trayvon Martin because he was released from custody on 
$150,000 bail.11 
Bail is a distinctive component of the United States’ legal system in 
that it provides wealthy individuals with the opportunity to avoid 
pretrial detention, while making it more likely that indigent 
defendants will remain incarcerated before either an admission or a 
finding of guilt.12  Even if bail is set at an amount that most people 
would view as insignificant, it could still be prohibitive for an indigent 
defendant.  A Human Rights Watch study found that in 2008, eighty-
seven percent of New York City defendants were unable to post bail 
when it was set for merely $1000 or less.13  These charges were all 
non-felony offenses and nearly three quarters of them were for minor 
transgressions such as trespassing, shoplifting, theft of services 
 
 6. Chew v. State, No. 07-06-0210-CR, 2006 WL 2080625, at *1 (Tex. App. July 
27, 2006). 
 7. Russ Buettner, Top Judge Says Bail in New York Isn’t Safe or Fair, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, at A1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Jennifer Sullivan, Seattle Lawyer Facing Rape Charges Free on Bail, SEATTLE 
TIMES: THE TODAY FILE (Nov. 1, 2012, 5:48 AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/ 
today/2012/11/seattle-lawyer-facing-rape-charges-free-on-bail. 
 11. Matt Flegenheimer, George Zimmerman Released After Posting Bail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/us/george-zimmerman-
released-after-posting-bail-in-trayvon-martin-case.html. 
 12. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 1. 
 13. JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND 
PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK 
CITY 2 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210 
webwcover_0.pdf. 
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(turnstile jumping), or possession of marijuana.14  To make matters 
worse, the accused misdemeanants spent an average of sixteen days in 
confinement.15 
The vulnerability of indigent defendants is hardly a new 
phenomenon.  In fact, when Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in 
the mid-nineteenth century he noticed that the system of bail was 
disproportionately detrimental to the poor and inherently aristocratic. 
It is evident that such a [system of bail] is hostile to the poor, and 
favorable only to the rich. The poor man has not always a security to 
produce, even in a civil case; and if he is obliged to wait for justice in 
prison, he is speedily reduced to distress.  The wealthy person, on 
the contrary, always escapes imprisonment in civil cases; nay, more, 
if he has committed a crime, he may readily elude the punishment 
by breaking his bail. Thus all the penalties of the law are, for him, 
reducible to fines.  Nothing can [be] more aristocratic than this 
system of legislation.16 
Since de Tocqueville first observed that the United States’ bail 
system unfairly discriminates against the poor, pretrial detention has 
only become more common.17  Today, sixty-two percent of the 
country’s incarcerated population is comprised of individuals waiting 
to be tried.18  Being detained pretrial deprives the defendant of the 
most crucial stage of a criminal case and exacerbates the chances of 
the accused being acquitted.19  Furthermore, defendants who are 
detained pretrial typically receive harsher sentences than those who 
are either released on their own recognizance or able to post bail.20 
In an effort to promote judicial parity for indigent defendants, The 
Bronx Defenders, a non-profit organization that provides legal 
 
 14. Id. at 24. 
 15. Id. at 71. 
 16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 49–50 (Henry Reeve 
trans., Barnes & Nobel World Digital Library 2000) (1835). 
 17. See generally THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS (2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf; Buettner, supra note 
7. 
 18. Aimee Mayer, For the Poor, Bail Often Means Jail, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://hrbrief.org/2011/03/for-the-poor-bail-often-means-jail. 
 19. See Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another 
Alternative to New York’s Bail Bond Business, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 307, 316 (2010). The 
Supreme Court deemed the pretrial stage the “most critical period” of the 
proceeding because that is when defendants meet with counsel and develop a defense 
strategy. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). 
 20. See id. 
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representation to impoverished individuals who are charged with 
crimes in Bronx County,21 solicited donations to create the Bronx 
Freedom Fund (Freedom Fund).22  The Freedom Fund was a non-
profit corporation that was designed to preserve the liberties of the 
accused by using charitable donations to post bail for certain Bronx 
Defenders clients.23 
Roughly 130 Bronx Defenders clients were bailed out by the 
Freedom Fund during its eighteen months of operation.24  Although 
these defendants returned to court at a high rate,25 the Fund was shut 
down in 2009.26  In People v. Miranda, the Bronx Supreme Court 
rejected bail paid by the Freedom Fund because the Fund 
contravened public policy by serving as both a bail bond business and 
an insurance business without a valid license.27  Because the Fund was 
neither registered as a charitable group nor licensed by the state to 
operate as a “bail bond business” pursuant to New York insurance 
law, the court terminated the practices of the “uninsured bail bond 
business.”28  In addition, the Court alluded to the possibility of ethical 
violations by the Bronx Defenders attorneys for their involvement 
with the Fund, but left the ethical questions unresolved.29 
In 2012, New York passed An Act to Amend the Insurance Law, in 
Relation to Charitable Bail Organizations (The Charitable Bail 
Bonds Bill or Bill), which exempts charitable and non-profit 
organizations, like the Bronx Freedom Fund, from the licensing 
requirement that People v. Miranda required.30  In signing the 
legislation, which came into effect in October 2012, Governor Cuomo 
deemed it “unacceptable for defendants to have to spend time in jail 
 
 21. Holistic Defense, Defined, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders. 
org/our-work/holistic-defense (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 22. See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 
5160(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 23. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
 24. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *8. 
 25. Of the 130 individuals that the Bronx Freedom Fund bailed out from 2007 to 
2009, ninety-five percent of the defendants made their court date. Jamila Pringle, Bail 
Fund Aims to Free Poor Defendants, BROOKLYN BUREAU (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://www.bkbureau.org/2012/08/13/bail-fund-aims-to-free-poor-defendants. 
 26. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *15; see also Joel Stashenko, Lippman 
Lauds Bronx Group’s Nonprofit Approach to Bail Defenders, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 
2013, at 1, 7. 
 27. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *10. 
 28. See Stashenko, supra note 26, at 1, 7. 
 29. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *18; Stashenko, supra note 26. 
 30. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6805 (McKinney 2009). 
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for low-level crimes they may have not committed simply because 
they are unable to meet the bail requirement.”31 
While the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill is certainly a valiant attempt 
to promote equity for indigent defendants who are vulnerable to 
pretrial incarceration,32 it remains to be seen whether the Bill will 
accomplish anything.  It is plausible that the Bill will be rendered less 
effective than anticipated if an attorney’s involvement with the 
charitable organization is deemed to be unethical pursuant to New 
York’s Rules of Professional Conduct.  Although non-profit 
organizations that are unaffiliated with legal services organizations 
can post bail for indigent individuals without worrying about ethical 
constraints, it is unclear whether attorneys, like those at the Bronx 
Defenders, can abide by standards of ethics while also creating or 
working with a charitable organization to post bail for their clients. 
Part I of this Note addresses the plight of indigent criminal 
defendants, attorneys’ efforts to reduce their vulnerability, and the 
Charitable Bail Bonds Bill and its effort to promote alternatives to 
for-profit bail bondsmen.  Part II enumerates the ethical questions 
that are likely to arise once attorneys at legal services organizations, 
like those at the Bronx Defenders, begin working with charitable 
corporations who post bail for the attorney’s clients.  Part III seeks to 
resolve the ethical questions that are still left unanswered in the wake 
of People v. Miranda and the ratification of the Charitable Bail Bonds 
Bill. 
I.  BAIL, ITS TENDENCY TO PROMOTE AN INFERENCE OF GUILT 
FOR INDIGENT MISDEMEANANTS, AND ALTERNATIVES TO FOR-
PROFIT BAIL BONDSMEN 
A. Bail and Its Impact on Indigent Defendants 
Bail is not meant to serve as a punishment to the criminal 
defendant.33  In fact, the purpose of bail is not even to insure against 
future criminal conduct.34  Instead, bail is a procedural mechanism 
that seeks to serve the dual purpose of promoting law enforcement by 
 
 31. Press Release, Governor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to 
Help Low-Income Defendants Meet Bail Requirements (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/07182012-Help-Low-Income-Defendants-Meet-
Bail. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Pringle, supra note 25. 
 34. See United States v. D’Argento, 227 F. Supp. 596, 602 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
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encouraging defendants to return to court, while simultaneously 
upholding the presumption of innocence that is a hallmark of the 
American legal system.35  Because there has been no finding of guilt 
at the time bail is issued, it cannot be used as an instrument to punish 
the accused, but is instead “intended as a catalyst to aid the 
appearance of the defendant when wanted.”36 
Although the purpose of bail is not to punish the accused, it is 
more punitive for certain individuals.  For indigent defendants, the 
issuance of bail poses a unique set of challenges.37  First, indigent 
defendants are likely unable to post bail even when it is set 
exceptionally low.  In 2010, for example, forty percent of Brooklyn’s 
criminal defendants who had bail set at $500 or less were unable to 
come up with the money.38  These defendants, who were all accused 
of minor crimes such as theft or trespassing, were incarcerated before 
any guilty verdict.39  This time in jail not only impedes the defendant’s 
opportunity to meet with counsel and construct a defense, but it also 
prevents the accused from going to work, attending school, or 
receiving any physical or mental therapy to which they may be 
accustomed.40 
Because of the threat of continued confinement, indigent 
defendants frequently accept plea offers in order to promptly get out 
of jail.41  If a detained defendant either refuses to plea out or does not 
receive an offer from the prosecution, she can spend weeks or even 
longer awaiting trial.42  If, however, the imprisoned defendant accepts 
the plea, she can instantly return home with a conditional discharge, a 
fine, or “time served.”43  Although accepting the plea often ends the 
incarceration period, the conviction will likely have devastating 
collateral consequences for the indigent defendant.44  The defendant’s 
 
 35. See Patricia A. Reed, Pretrial Bail: A Deprivation of Liberty or Property with 
Due Process of Law, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1575, 1581 (1983). 
 36. See United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 37. See generally Mayer, supra note 18. 
 38. See Pringle, supra note 25. 
 39. See generally Mayer, supra note 18. 
 40. See generally Clisura, supra note 19, at 317. 
 41. See FELLNER, supra note 13, at 32–33. 
 42. See id. at 31–32. 
 43. See id. at 32.  When a defendant is remanded prior to trial, the “time served” 
incarcerated while awaiting trial is subtracted from the sentence the defendant 
ultimately receives upon either a plea or a guilty verdict. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
70.30 (McKinney 2009). 
 44. See FELLNER, supra note 13, at 32. 
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new criminal record can completely hinder the individual’s job 
prospects, bar the individual from receiving public housing, and also 
potentially cloud a judge’s perception of the individual if they are 
arrested again.45 
Moreover, the vulnerability of the detained indigent is exacerbated 
by the fact that their pretrial incarceration ultimately dictates the 
terms of the plea offer.46  Unlike a detained defendant who has little 
bargaining power, non-felony defendants who are free pretrial have 
no reason to accept an offer that involves jail time.47  As a result, they 
will likely fight the case rather than plead out.48  Because the state’s 
case typically weakens as time progresses, this strategy gives the 
defendant a better chance of being acquitted.49  In fact, the New York 
City Criminal Justice Agency found that non-felony pretrial detainees 
had a ninety-two percent conviction rate, whereas non-felony 
defendants who were released pretrial had a fifty percent conviction 
rate.50 
B. For-Profit Bail Bondsmen 
Although a defendant who is unable to post bail can hire a bail 
bondsman to help front the cost, an indigent accused of a 
misdemeanor may be unable to do so.51  Rather than paying the court 
once bail is set, the accused can pay a bail bondsman ten percent of 
the requisite bail to insure his return.52  When bail is set low, however, 
it will be difficult to find a bail bondsman willing to post bond for 
such a nominal fee.53  Many bondsmen deem that a profit of only $100 
will not be worth the bondsman’s time of potentially locating a “bail 
skip.”54  In fact, many bail bond businesses will only post bond for fees 
of $1000 or more.55  This is troubling for accused misdemeanants who 
cannot afford to post bail, yet did not have bail set in an amount that 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at 33. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See generally Clisura, supra note 19, at 310–11. 
 52. See id. at 311. 
 53. See id. at 310. 
 54. See id. at 310–11. 
 55. See id. at 310. 
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would be enough to entice a bail bondsman.  As a result, the accused 
is left to await trial while in jail. 
While indigent defendants often have difficulty finding a for-profit 
bail bondsman who will post bond on their behalf, accused individuals 
who can afford their services view a bail bondsman as a necessary cost 
to avoid pretrial incarceration.56  Acting like an insurance company, 
the bail bondsman posts collateral on the defendant’s behalf ensuring 
that she will attend her next court date.57  If a defendant fails to 
appear, the bail bondsman loses the collateral unless or until the “bail 
skip” is located and brought to court.  Not only is it financially 
burdensome to the bail bondsman if the defendant skips bail, but it 
also hinders their relationship with insurance underwriters.58  
Insurance companies require bail bond businesses to create and 
maintain “buildup funds” in the event that a bail skip occurs.59  The 
funds, which are comprised of the nonrefundable fees that the bail 
bondsman has acquired over the years, will be tapped into whenever 
a defendant fails to appear.60  In order to continue operating as a bail 
bond business, the bondsman is required by their insurance company 
to have a “buildup fund” that surpasses a certain dollar threshold.61  If 
a “buildup fund” is routinely dipped into to post bond for bail skips, 
then the insurance company will likely prevent the bondsman from 
bailing out future defendants.62  It is imperative, therefore, that the 
bail bondsman promptly locates the bail skip and returns her to the 
state’s custody.63 
 Initially, the bondsman hopes that the police are able to find 
the defendant.64  In reality, however, the police lack the time and 
resources to locate every bail skip.65  As the time limit for returning 
the defendant draws nearer, which is usually ninety to 180 days after 
 
 56. See Ralph Thomas, The Bail Bond Recovery Business, BAIL ENFORCEMENT 
RESOURCE CENTER, http://pimall.com/nais/n.bailrec.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
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the defendant fails to appear,66 the bondsman may hire a bounty 
hunter to locate the bail skip and return her to the state’s custody.67  
While the cost for hiring a bounty hunter is steep, a bail bondsman’s 
incentive to locate and return the bail skip often compels them to pay 
the fee.68  Not only is there a monetary incentive for the bail 
bondsman to return the defendant, but his insurance company will 
forbid him from running his business if he continues to post bail for 
defendants who ultimately warrant.69 
C. Attorneys Posting Bail for Their Clients and Attendant 
Ethical Concerns 
Criminal defense attorneys recognize the disadvantages their 
clients face when they are unable to post bail70 and, as a result, often 
seek to post bail on their behalf.  By bailing out their clients, 
attorneys inherit “a financial interest in the outcome of a case” that 
will only end when their client has either attended all of her court 
dates or is returned to the state’s custody.71  Although the Ethics 
Committee has stated that it is possible for an attorney to ethically 
post bail for a client when she reasonably believes that a conflict of 
interest will not arise, the Committee acknowledges that “[o]ther than 
in relatively unusual circumstances”72 a conflict of interest will exist: 
[A] lawyer may post, or arrange for the posting of, a bond to secure 
the release from custody of a client whom the lawyer represents in 
the matter with respect to which the client has been detained, but 
only in those rare circumstances in which there is no significant risk 
that her representation of the client will be materially limited by her 
personal interest in recovering the amount advanced.73 
These “rare circumstances” include when (1) the amount of money 
is so nominal that it is of no consequence to the attorney, (2) the 
lawyer posting bail is a close friend of the clients, and reasonably 
 
 66. See Alex Tabarrok, The Bounty Hunter’s Pursuit of Justice, WILSON Q., 
Winter 2011, at 56, available at http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/sites/default/files/ 
articles/WQ_VOL35_W_2011_Article_05_2.pdf. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Thomas, supra note 56. 
 70. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 71. See Dayla S. Pepi & Donna D. Bloom, Take the Money or Run: The Risky 
Business of Acting as Both Your Client’s Lawyer and Bail Bondsman, 37 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 933, 961 (2006). 
 72. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004). 
 73. Id. 
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expects to be reimbursed, (3) the lawyer agrees in writing that she will 
not exercise her right to legal recourse against the client, and (4) the 
lawyer reasonably believes that the client will almost certainly make 
her court date.74  If the situation fails to fall neatly into one of the 
enumerated circumstances, it is still possible that an attorney may 
ethically post bail for a client.75  When determining whether it is 
unethical for an attorney to do so, the ABA examines “the particular 
facts surrounding the lawyer-client relationship; the lawyer 
contemplating posting a bond on behalf of a client is permitted to 
take into account the totality of circumstances in deciding whether a 
conflict of interest will arise should the lawyer so act.”76 
Although several states do not explicitly preclude attorneys from 
posting bail for their clients, state Bar associations typically condemn 
the practice and insist that attorneys should avoid acting as their 
client’s bondsman.77  While there is no express ban on the practice in 
New York, attorneys in the state are not allowed to profit from 
posting bail for their clients.78  Other states such as Wisconsin, North 
Carolina, and Michigan, on the other hand, have statutes that 
unequivocally bar attorneys from providing bail for their clients, and 
even punish perpetrators of the law for misconduct.79 
Even though the practice of an attorney doubling as her client’s 
bondsman is viewed unfavorably by both the ABA and most states, 
some jurisdictions make an exception for indigent defendants.80  In 
fact, even jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit attorneys from posting 
bail for their clients, such as Michigan, recognize an exception for 
indigent clients: “[b]ecause a lawyer representing an indigent 
client does not expect the client to repay him, the conflict of interest 
concern that is usually at issue when a lawyer posts a bond on behalf 
of a client does not arise.”81  By posting bail for an indigent client, the 
 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Deborah Markowitz, The Attorney’s Query: May a Lawyer Ethically Post 
a Bond or Serve as a Surety on Behalf of a Client?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 
969 (2005). 
 77. See, John Caher, Lawyer’s Offer to Cover Client’s Bail Raises Ethical 
Concerns, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2012, at 2. 
 78. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2009). 
 79. See Caher, supra note 77, at 2 (citing State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Formal Op. E-96-1 (1996); N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 173 (1994); 
State Bar of Mich. Prof’l Ethics Comm. RI-65 (1990)). 
 80. See Markowitz, supra note 76, at 963 n.24. 
 81. Id. 
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attorney “acquiesces in having the amount used to pay the costs and 
agrees either not to be reimbursed at all or to look only to the 
proceeds of the recovery for reimbursement.”82  Devoid of a financial 
interest that they expect to attain, the attorney is thereby not 
conflicted between representing her client and reacquiring her 
collateral.  In addition, New York, New Jersey, and several other 
states83 explicitly allow attorneys to pay court costs and expenses of 
litigation, which bail is frequently considered,84 for indigent clients. 
D. The Bronx Freedom Fund: The Bronx Defenders’ 
Alternative to “For-Profit” Bail Bondsmen 
Critics of New York’s bail system insist that bail essentially “serves 
as a de facto sentence before trial” for indigent defendants.85  As 
opposed to upholding the country’s firm commitment to “innocent 
until proven guilty,” bail “reflexively reflect[s] a presumption of 
guilt.”86  By effectively detaining indigent individuals for extended 
periods of time prior to a finding of guilt, the bail system is 
“essentially sentence first, disposition second.”87  As a result, 
adversaries of the current bail system, including Chief Judge Jonathan 
Lippman of the New York Court of Appeals, have encouraged the 
state to adopt alternatives to “for-profit” bail bondsman.88 
In an effort to provide bail for indigent clients who would 
otherwise be subjected to pretrial detention, The Bronx Defenders 
created the Bronx Freedom Fund, a non-profit corporation, in 2007.89  
The Freedom Fund, which was comprised of grant money and 
charitable donations,90 was “formed for the purposes of supporting 
indigent clients of the Bronx Defenders . . . and helping them avoid 
the cost of short jail sentences”91 by posting bail for certain clients.92  
 
 82. State Bar of Mich. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. RI-91 (1991). 
 83. Financial Assistance to Clients, 51 Laws. Man. On Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) 801 (2012), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
litigationnews/top_stories/docs/ABA_Manual_Financial_Assistance.pdf. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Buettner, supra note 7. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *4 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); Jarrett Murphy, Awaiting Justice: The Punishing Price of 
NYC’s Bail System, CITY LIMITS, Fall 2007, at 4, 29. 
 90. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *3. 
 91. Id. at *4. 
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In order to tap funds from the Freedom Fund, attorneys at the Bronx 
Defenders first referred their client’s case to Zoe Towns, a non-
lawyer who was the sole employee of the charitable organization.  Ms. 
Towns then screened the referred individual and determined whether 
the Fund would post bail on the client’s behalf.93 
The Freedom Fund listed four factors that ought to be considered 
when making this determination: (1) the individual must first be a 
client of the Bronx Defenders; (2) bail must be set in an amount no 
greater than $1500; (3) the top charge on the accusatory instrument 
must be a misdemeanor or a non-violent felony; and (4) the CJA 
score, which is a report filed with the court that uses a number of 
factors to determine the defendant’s “flight risk,” must be at least 
three.94  While the four factors helped guide Ms. Towns’ 
determination of whether the defendant should qualify for bail 
 
 92. See id. at *3. 
 93. See id. at *5. 
 94. See id. at *4.  At arraignments, New York City courts use a point system (CJA 
form) to help predict whether a defendant exhibits a heightened risk of flight. 
QUDSIA SIDDIQI, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW 
PRETRIAL RELEASE SYSTEM IN NEW YORK CITY: PHASE II OF THE POST-
IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH 1–3 (2005), available at http://www.cjareports.org/ 
reports/june05.pdf.  If the defendant receives a score of seven points or higher, she is 
recommended for release. Id. at 10.  If the arrestee’s score is between three and six, 
the defendant is at a moderate risk of flight. Id.  Finally, if the defendant scores 
anywhere from negative twelve, the lowest possible score, to two, she is not 
recommended for release. Id.  Although the judge is not obligated to follow the CJA 
form, see id. at 1, it serves as a quick and potentially helpful indication of whether the 
defendant is likely to appear.  The recommendation system is largely based on a 
defendant’s ties to the community. See id. at 4.  The six factors that the court utilizes 
to determine the defendant’s flight risk include: 
1. Does defendant report a NYC area address? 
2. Does defendant have a working telephone in his or her residence or a 
cellular phone? 
3. Is defendant employed, or in school, or training program (or a 
combination of these) full time? 
4. Does defendant expect someone at arraignment? 
5. Does the prior bench warrant count equal zero? 
6. Does the open case count equal zero? 
Id. at 7.  If the defendant’s response to questions one, three, and four are accurate 
and verified by the court, the defendant receives one point. See id. at 8–9.  If the 
defendant does not have the requisite information or provides false information, the 
defendant receives negative points. See id.  The defendant receives either positive 
three points if she has a NYC address, or negative two if she does not. See id.  If the 
defendant previously warranted (failed to appear to a court date), she receives 
negative five points. See id.  If the defendant was either never arrested or attended all 
of her court dates when she was, she receives positive five points. See id. at 8.  Lastly, 
if the defendant has another open criminal case, she will lose a point. See id. 
PETROSSIAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:28 PM 
2026 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
assistance, she had permission from the Fund’s Board of Directors to 
post bail in excess of $1500 in certain situations so long as she 
reasonably believed it to be appropriate.95  Despite her level of 
discretion, she did not tap into the Freedom Fund’s resources every 
time a Bronx Defenders attorney referred a client.96  Instead, she used 
the CJA report and any information that the attorney gathered from 
working with the defendant to determine if the client qualified for 
bail assistance.97  When she agreed to use the Fund’s resources, she 
strived to maintain contact with the defendant and periodically 
inform the accused that if she did not show up for her court date, the 
bail money would be forfeited and thus be unavailable for future 
clients. 
Of the 130 individuals that the Bronx Freedom Fund bailed out 
from 2007 to 2009, ninety-five percent of the defendants made their 
court date.98  None of the 130 defendants were ultimately sentenced 
to jail, and nearly fifty percent of the defendants had their cases 
dismissed or adjourned.99  While the data accentuates that “[w]ithout 
access to bail, poor people who would otherwise go free were 
pleading guilty and filling jail cells,”100 the legality of the Bronx 
Freedom Fund was eventually scrutinized in People v. Miranda. 
In People v. Miranda, the Bronx Supreme Court held that by acting 
as both a bail bond business and an insurance business, the Fund 
contravened public policy because it was neither properly licensed 
nor supervised by the Commissioner of Insurance.101  The court 
underscored that the Bronx Freedom Fund did not qualify for an 
Insurance Law exemption that would have enabled the Fund to 
continue their practices without a license.102  Instead, by avoiding all 
oversight, the Freedom Fund undermined the need to “strict[ly] 
control and overs[ee]” the country’s bail bond business.103 
While the court ultimately accepted the District Attorney’s 
argument that the Fund violated public policy, they failed to issue a 
ruling on whether the close connection between the Bronx Defenders 
 
 95. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *8. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Pringle, supra note 25. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Nick Pinto, Making Bail Better, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 10 2012), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-10-10/news/making-bail-better/. 
 101. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *15. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at *12. 
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attorneys and the Freedom Fund elicited an ethical violation.104  In 
arguing for the Fund to be shut down, the Bronx District Attorney 
alleged that the close legal ties between Ms. Towns and the Bronx 
Defenders attorneys, which included Ms. Towns’ unchecked access to 
legal files for Bronx Defenders clients, violated standards of ethics.105 
Although the presumption is that attorneys can ethically provide 
bail for their clients in only unusual circumstances,106 the court stated 
that there is “no ABA opinion that forbids an attorney from being 
involved in the posting of bail where no financial interests are 
implicated.”107  Unlike other attorneys who use their own funds to bail 
out their clients, the Bronx Defenders attorneys relied on donations 
from third parties to post bail for their clients.108  Without a tangible 
financial loss at stake, it is plausible that the attorneys were not 
conflicted between recovering their collateral and representing their 
client.  Similarly, the New York State Bar Association Committee on 
Professional Ethics does not provide an explicit answer on whether 
this practice is ethical.109  Without either an ABA or a New York 
Ethics opinion directly addressing the issue, the court left the ethical 
concerns unresolved. 
E. The Charitable Bail Bonds Bill 
Three years after the Bronx Freedom Fund was deemed unlawful, 
New York legislatures ratified the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill.110  The 
Bill empowers charitable organizations to provide bail for indigents 
accused of misdemeanors provided that bail is set at no more than 
$2000, the charitable group is registered as a 501(c)(3) organization, 
and that the organization does not charge a fee for its services.111  The 
purpose of the law is to provide accused indigents with the 
opportunity to avoid pretrial incarceration by enabling charitable 
 
 104. See generally id. at *19 (“Since there is no clear legal precedent covering the 
unique and limited facts revealed in this bail hearing, this Court cannot issue a ruling 
on the ethical question raised by the People.”). 
 105. Id. at *16. 
 106. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004). 
 107. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *18. 
 108. Id. at *21. 
 109. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 110. Press Release, supra note 31. 
 111. Id. 
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organizations to post bail on their behalf.112  In doing so, the Bill 
exempts charitable bail organizations from certain licensing 
requirements.113 
Even though the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill became law in July 
2012, its effectiveness is yet to be determined.114  As of January 2013, 
Robin Steinberg, executive director of the Bronx Defenders, “said 
the Bronx fund is gearing up to begin providing bail money again for 
indigent defendants once the state completes promulgating rules 
under the 2012 law.”115 
Although it will take some time before we can discern how indigent 
defendants are affected by the legislation,116 it is possible that the Bill 
will be less effective than anticipated.  While it is not the focus of this 
Note, it remains possible that criminal justice concerns will compel 
judges to simply reject bail posted by the charitable organization. 
More likely, though, is the possibility that the practice will be 
regarded as unethical.  If the New York State Bar Association deems 
that attorneys at legal services organizations violate their ethical 
responsibilities when they create or team-up with charitable 
organizations that provide bail for their clients, then the practice will 
soon be halted.  If ethical concerns preclude legal services 
organizations from implementing charitable funds or working with an 
existing one, then how else will an indigent defendant benefit from 
the new Bill? 
While ethical concerns will not prevent charitable groups that are 
not affiliated with legal services organizations from posting bail for 
certain indigent defendants, at this point it is unclear whether non-
legal charitable organizations will commit the time, energy, and 
resources to implement a fund that either solicits donations or uses 
the organization’s resources to bail out an individual they may know 
nothing about.  In fact, despite the Bill’s ratification nearly six months 
earlier, Robin Steinberg acknowledged that “she knew of no other 
charitable organization that plans to offer bail.”117  Unlike non-legal 
charitable groups, legal services organizations similar to the Bronx 
 
 112. See Cindy Rodriguez, Charities to Play Bail Bondsman Role, WNYC NEWS 
(July 23, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/jul/23/charities-now-
allowed-post-bail-poor-new-york-state/. 
 113. Press Release, supra note 31. 
 114. S. S07752, 2012 Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012). 
 115. Stashenko, supra note 26, at 7. 
 116. See generally id. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
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Defenders are likely eager to implement their own bail fund.118  Public 
defense attorneys are undoubtedly aware of the harsh consequences 
their clients face when they are detained pretrial,119 and will likely 
pursue any opportunity that lawfully gives their client a better chance 
of being acquitted.120  As a result, forecasting the effectiveness of the 
Bill is largely based on whether it is ethical for attorneys at legal 
services organizations, like those at the Bronx Defenders, to either 
implement their own charitable fund or work closely with another 
organization that has their own. 
F. Attorney-Client Privilege 
A central tenet of the American legal system is that attorneys are 
afforded the right to withhold information about their client pursuant 
to the attorney-client privilege.121  In order to facilitate full and honest 
interaction between attorneys and their clients, it is imperative that 
certain communications are kept confidential.122  While this privilege 
is frequently recognized as valid only between an attorney and her 
client, New York law extends the privilege to communications 
between attorneys and their non-attorney colleagues and employees 
in certain situations.123 
Although Ms. Towns was not an attorney, she was provided with 
unfettered access to legal files for all clients that were referred to the 
Fund for bail assistance.  In addition, the attorneys handed Ms. 
Towns information about the defendant that was gathered during 
attorney-client conversations.124  As a result, she may be able to 
invoke the attorney-client privilege to “prevent[] any fact-finding 
about what the individuals who sought the legal advice told. . . other 
[Bronx Defenders] lawyers.”125 
 
 118. See Pinto, supra note 100.  Shortly after the Bill was passed, the Brooklyn 
Defender Services began preparing for the creation of their own Bail Fund. Id. 
 119. See Clisura, supra note 19, at 317; see also discussion supra Part I.A. 
 120. Being detained pretrial drastically impedes the misdemeanant’s potential for 
obtaining an acquittal. See FELLNER, supra note 13, at 33–34. 
 121. See Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 15 Misc. 3d 308, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 122. See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to 
Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909, 923 (2009). 
 123. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (McKinney 2007); see also People v. Miranda, No. 
012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (quoting 
People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185–86 (N.Y. 1989)). 
 124. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17. 
 125. Id. at *13. 
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If the attorney-client privilege applies to Ms. Towns, the employee 
cannot be compelled to testify about certain communications the 
client had with her attorney.126  More importantly, if the Bronx 
Defenders attorneys treated Ms. Towns as if she was governed by the 
privilege, then she was likely an agent of the Bronx Defenders.127  
Non-lawyers who are agents of either the attorney or the client must 
uphold a duty of confidentiality to the client, just as attorneys are 
required.128  Pursuant to Rule 5.3 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, attorneys must hold their agents to the professional 
obligations of the lawyer. 129  If the Bronx Defenders attorneys did not 
want the non-attorneys to be bound by the obligations of the lawyer, 
then they should not have shared the client’s file with them.130  In fact, 
if the attorneys revealed the client’s confidential information to a 
non-agent, they likely breached their duty of confidentiality to the 
client.131 
From an ethical perspective, it is of great benefit to the client if the 
non-legal employee is an agent of the attorney because otherwise the 
client’s confidential information would be at risk.132  That agency 
relationship, however, may not be conducive to the responsibilities of 
a bail bondsman, who must disclose all information, even if it is 
contrary to the defendant’s interests, in order to properly perform her 
job.  Although it is necessary to establish whether Ms. Towns was an 
agent of a Bronx Defenders attorney, this determination is a matter 
of contract and agency law, and thus not the focus of this Note.  But, 
as the court held in People v. Miranda, if there was no such agency 
relationship in place between the attorneys and Ms. Towns, disclosing 
the client’s file to the non-attorney would likely cause an ethical 
problem.133  As a result, Part II and Part III examine whether non-
legal employees working for charitable organizations, like Ms. Towns, 
could ethically post bail for certain individuals if they are considered 
agents of the attorney. 
 
 126. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 2007). 
 127. See generally Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17. 
 128. See Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 15 Misc. 3d 308, 316–17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2007). 
 129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
 132. See id. 
 133. People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
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II.  ENUMERATING THE ETHICAL CONCERNS THAT EXIST WHEN 
ATTORNEYS AT LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS WORK 
CLOSELY WITH CHARITABLE BAIL FUNDS 
Although the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill enables charitable 
organizations to implement funds that provide bail for certain 
criminal defendants, attorneys’ involvement with bail funds will 
continue to be scrutinized because ethical questions still loom.  The 
practice of serving as both a bail bondsman and an attorney for a 
criminal defendant raises ethical questions in four areas: (1) the 
potential “conflict with the client involving the lawyer’s own 
potentially adverse pecuniary [or personal] interest; (2) protection of 
client confidentiality; (3) improper solicitation of clients; and (4) 
financial relationships between a lawyer and his client.”134  If 
charitable bail funds run afoul of any of these ethical concerns, the 
practice could soon be halted. 
A. Conflict of Interest 
Although the New York State Bar Association Committee on 
Professional Ethics has only explicitly precluded attorneys from 
posting bail for their clients when they profit from doing so,135 there is 
a presumption that posting bail for one’s own client creates a conflict 
of interest for the attorney pursuant to Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.136  When an attorney posts bail for a client, she 
contracts with the state to guarantee the appearance of her client at 
future court dates.137  If the client fails to appear, the attorney turned 
bail bondsman must forfeit the money.138  The contract, therefore, 
“provides a financial obligation where the lawyer’s interests could 
potentially conflict with the interests of the client.”139 
An attorney’s “basic duty . . . is to serve as the accused’s counselor 
and advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective, 
quality representation.”140  An attorney’s ability to do so, however, 
could be tempered by a desire to recover their pecuniary interest.  
 
 134. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 976–77. 
 135. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993). 
 136. See discussion supra Part I.C. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004). 
 137. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 978. 
 140. Id. at 983 (quoting JOHN M. BURKHOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS 754 (2d 
ed. 2005)). 
PETROSSIAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:28 PM 
2032 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
The South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee, for example, opined 
that “by obtaining a financial stake in the handling of a particular 
case, an attorney might be tempted to push his client into accepting a 
settlement offer which the attorney would ordinarily advise be turned 
down.”141  By encouraging her client to accept the settlement, the 
attorney is assured that her collateral is returned, but is shunning her 
responsibility to act in the best interest of the client.  Occupying both 
roles, therefore, could serve as a challenge for the attorney and as a 
detriment to the client. 
An attorney’s pecuniary interest is not the only interest that is 
capable of hindering her ability to diligently represent her client.  An 
attorney’s unyielding loyalty to her client serves as both a cornerstone 
of the attorney-client relationship142 and as the “most fundamental of 
all fiduciary duties the legal profession owes to its clients.”143  “This 
loyalty can only be properly carried out,” however, “if a lawyer fully 
comprehends that any other interest of the lawyer, whether personal 
or professional, has the potential to compromise, if not destroy, the 
lawyer’s necessary dedication to vindicating the client’s legal 
position.”144  Therefore, anything that dilutes the attorney’s loyalty to 
her client should not be permitted.  When evaluating whether an 
attorney’s representation could be adversely affected, it is necessary 
to examine whether the attorney’s personal interests, and not just 
those that are pecuniary, could impede with her ability to diligently 
represent her client.145 
B. Duty of Confidentiality 
Distinct from the attorney-client privilege is an attorney’s ethical 
obligation to uphold her duty of confidentiality to her client.146  The 
duty of confidentiality applies not merely to matters communicated in 
confidence by the client, but also to all information relating to the 
client’s representation, whatever its source.147  The ethical obligation 
 
 141. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 90-02 (1990). 
 142. See Wald, supra note 122, at 911. 
 143. Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client 
Loyalty, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 567, 570 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
images/pdfs/1063.pdf. 
 144. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.7(a)(2) (2013). 
 146. Id. r. 1.6. 
 147. Id. r. 1.6(a)(3).  An attorney has an obligation not to disclose “any 
information that is likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the client . . . or 
information that the client has requested be kept confidential.” Id. 
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of a lawyer not to disclose the client’s confidential information “not 
only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper 
representation of the client but also encourages non-lawyers to seek 
early legal assistance.”148  If attorneys freely revealed their clients’ 
confidences, the public’s trust in the legal system would surely 
wane.149 
A bail bondsman is a licensed agent of the state who is 
contractually obliged to satisfy a number of responsibilities.150  First 
and foremost, the bondsman must make sure that her client attends 
all of her court dates.151  In the event of a bail skip, the bondsman 
must actively assist in locating the defendant or else forfeit her 
collateral, and eventually her license if her clients continue to 
warrant.152  Although an arrest warrant is often issued for the 
defendant after she fails to appear, police officers typically do not 
attempt to locate and detain the defendant, especially for minor 
offenses.153  Instead, it is typically left to the bondsman to find the 
defendant and subsequently return her to the state’s custody.154 
Because the bondsman is not constrained by the same ethical 
limitations as an attorney, the bondsman may freely disclose the 
client’s personal information.  Unlike a licensed bail bondsman, 
whose main responsibility is to insure that the defendant returns to 
court, an attorney who posts her client’s bail must also uphold her 
duty of confidentiality to the client.  But because the “rule of 
confidentiality is generally thought to prohibit a lawyer from 
revealing information concerning the whereabouts of his client,”155 an 
attorney may be precluded from revealing personal information 
about a client who recently jumped bail. 
In addition, if the court orders that the bondsman disclose the 
whereabouts of the defendant, they must do so.156  Because no 
privilege attaches to communications between a non-attorney bail 
bondsman and an arrested individual, the court can compel a 
bondsman to provide information regarding the defendant and her 
 
 148. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975). 
 149. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009). 
 150. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6805 (McKinney 2009). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Thomas, supra note 56. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id.  While the bondsman typically tries to locate the defendant herself, she has 
the option of hiring a bounty hunter to do the job for her. Id. 
 155. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995). 
 156. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
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whereabouts.  An attorney, on the other hand, initially may not be 
compelled by the court to reveal her client’s confidential 
information.157  This could pose a problem for the court, who may 
immediately need information from the charitable organization in 
order to locate and return the bail skip.  Thus, issues of client 
confidentiality could put an attorney serving as a client’s bondsman in 
an ethical quandary.  Must an attorney remain loyal to her client, or 
can she ethically reveal privileged information about her client in the 
event of a bail skip? 
C. Improper Solicitation of Clients 
Attorneys who also serve as their clients’ bail bondsmen may act 
unethically if they use their practice of posting bail for their clients as 
a means to acquire business.158  Because posting bail is entirely 
unrelated to the legal services that an attorney can provide,159 the 
New York State Bar Association held that a bail 
bond business operated by an attorney “may not be used to solicit 
clients for the lawyer’s law practice.”160  The Ethics Opinion 
determined that an attorney committed an ethical violation when he 
sought to induce clients by paying for a billboard that read “Why pay 
for a Bondsman when you can get a Lawyer? ‘I will get you out of jail 
and defend you’ All Bail Bond Fees Apply to Attorney Fees.”161 
Furthermore, the rule against providing financial assistance to a 
client162 was designed in part to prevent clients from selecting 
attorneys based on which lawyers are willing to provide the most 
financial assistance to the client.163  Although financial assistance from 
an attorney to a client is sometimes permissible in New York,164 as 
soon as the practice becomes widely known by the public and is seen 
as a tool to acquire new clients, then it may be deemed unethical.  By 
routinely posting bail for their clients, an attorney could be 
improperly soliciting clients to seek her services simply because of the 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 7.1 (2013). 
 159. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 983. 
 160. Id. (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993)). 
 161. Id. at 989. 
 162. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 163. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2009). 
 164. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.8(e)(1)–(2) (2013). 
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attorney’s willingness to offer financial assistance.165  These attorneys 
are then able to enjoy a competitive advantage over other lawyers for 
reasons that are distinct from the quality of service that they provide. 
The bar has typically viewed competitive advantages that are 
unrelated to the attorney’s quality of service unfavorably.166  In ABA 
Opinion 288, for example, the Committee held that financial 
assistance to benefit an injured client was unethical once the practice 
was publicized because it “constitutes a holding out by the lawyer of 
an improper inducement to clients to employ him.”167  Similarly, 
in Carroll, a lawyer was disciplined for purchasing a vehicle for a 
destitute client in advance of litigation because “naturally a client will 
retain the lawyer who makes advances without regard to quality.”168 
The practice of attorneys posting bail for their clients could be 
unethical, therefore, if viewed as a tool to woo individuals to retain 
their services.  In Texas, for example, where there is no express 
prohibition against acting as both a client’s bondsman and attorney, 
the Bar was nonetheless “particularly concerned with the potential 
for the business of acting as surety on criminal bonds to easily become 
a feeder to the attorney’s practice of law.”169  Consequently, it is 
imperative that attorneys in Texas clearly accentuate that the practice 
of posting bail for their clients is not “at all motivated by a desire to 
advertise or solicit.”170 
D. Improper Financial Assistance and Entering into a 
Business Transaction with the Client 
Rule 1.8(e) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct 
prohibits attorneys from providing financial assistance to a client in 
connection with pending or contemplated litigation.171  This restriction 
on providing financial assistance to a client could be particularly 
devastating for indigent clients.  An attorney, for example, is 
forbidden from making or guaranteeing loans to her clients for living 
 
 165. James Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition of an 
Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 
235 (2003) (citing Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial 
Ethics, Op. 391 (1936)). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168. Id. at 251 (citing In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (1979)). 
 169. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 991–92 (quoting State Bar of Tex. Comm. on 
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, Op. 347 (1969)). 
 170. Id. at 992. 
 171. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.8(e) (2013). 
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expenses, and from “indemnify[ing] the client for the client’s failure 
to meet her own obligation[s].”172  This restriction is especially 
problematic if a defendant becomes aware of the fact that the plaintiff 
is impoverished.  As a litigation strategy, the defendant could 
intentionally delay trial, thereby increasing the cost of the litigation 
for the poor plaintiff.  The increased cost could then preclude the 
plaintiff from paying for certain living expenses.  And because the 
plaintiff is forbidden from acquiring a loan from her attorney, she 
may be compelled to terminate the litigation altogether in order to 
save money.173 
Recognizing the vulnerability of both indigent plaintiffs and 
defendants, the ABA maintains that, even in the absence of 
repayment upon recovery, “a lawyer representing an indigent client 
on a pro bono basis may pay court costs and reasonable litigation 
expenses on behalf of the client.”174  Although this carve-out enables 
attorneys to provide financial assistance in certain situations, 
identifying a “court cost” or “reasonable litigation expense” leads to 
some disagreement.  While bail, for example, is not an expense of 
litigation in Maryland,  it is viewed as such in Oregon.175  Similarly, 
the ABA has explicitly held that “a client’s bail can be considered 
among ‘court costs and expenses of litigation.’”176  The New York 
State Bar, though, has not addressed whether bail is considered a 
litigation expense.177 
Determining whether attorneys violate their ethical responsibility 
under Rule 1.8(e), therefore, likely comes down to whether posting 
bail is considered a litigation expense.  Another related concern is 
whether attorneys enter into a business transaction with their clients 
 
 172. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 852 (2011). 
 173. See generally Hope Todd, Helping the Indigent Client: A Threat to Lawyer 
Independence?, D.C. BAR (Nov. 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/ 
publications/washington_lawyer/november_2010/ethics.cfm. 
 174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (2013). 
 175. Financial Assistance to Clients, supra note 83. 
 176. Clisura, supra note 19, at 344 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004); see id. at 344 n.244 (“[A] lawyer may post, 
or arrange for the posting of, a bond to secure the release from custody of a client 
whom the lawyer represents . . . in those rare circumstances in which there is no 
significant risk that her representation of the client will be materially limited by her 
personal interest in recovering the amount advanced.” (quoting ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004)).  The jurisdictions that 
have addressed whether bail is a litigation expense are split. See id. 
 177. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *18 
n.25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
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pursuant to Rule 1.8(a) by working closely with the charitable bail 
fund. 
Rule 1.8(a) states that only in a few rare circumstances can an 
attorney “enter into a business transaction with a client if they have 
differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to 
exercise professional judgment therein for the protection of the 
client.”178  Although Rule 1.8 does not explicitly define “business 
transaction,” the comments state that business transactions do not 
include “standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and 
the client for products or services that the client generally markets to 
others.”179  The Committee makes this distinction because “[i]n such 
transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the 
client, and the restrictions are . . . unnecessary and impracticable.”180  
If agreeing to post bail for certain clients is considered a “business 
transaction,” the practice will soon be halted. 
III.  ANTICIPATING HOW ETHICS COMMITTEES WILL RESOLVE 
THE ETHICAL CONCERNS 
A. Does a Conflict of Interests Exist when Attorneys at Legal 
Services Organizations Work Closely with a Charitable 
Corporation that Posts Bail for the Attorney’s Clients? 
When attorneys post bail for their clients, the most obvious 
concern is that the attorney’s ability to act in the best interest of the 
client will be compromised by the attorney’s desire to recoup their 
financial investment.181  Although the prevailing view is that attorneys 
should refrain from acting as bondsmen for their clients in order to 
avoid a conflict of interest,182 “this view rests almost entirely on the 
financial relationship that exists when an attorney posts his or her 
own funds as bail for a client, and the risk that the attorney’s personal 
financial interests will conflict with his or her ability to act in 
the client’s interests.”183  Attorneys working at non-profit legal services 
organizations, like those at the Bronx Defenders, are able to 
circumvent that conflict by using the charitable donations in the 
 
 178. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.8(a) (2013). 
 179. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 1 (2009). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-
432 (2004). 
 182. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 183. Clisura, supra note 19, at 343. 
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Fund, rather than their own finances, to post bail for their clients.184  
Without a pecuniary interest at stake, the attorney’s ability to 
ardently represent her client is not hindered by a desire to reacquire 
her money.  But even though none of the attorney’s own financial 
interests are implicated, an attorney’s involvement with a charitable 
bail fund could still be unethical if an attorney’s personal interests 
hinder her ability to diligently represent her client.185 
Although the Bronx Defenders attorneys did not have a monetary 
interest at stake, Rule 1.7(a)(2) is not limited to those attorneys 
whose representation is tempered by a pecuniary interest.  Under 
Rule 1.7(a)(2), “a concurrent conflict of interest exists when a 
reasonable lawyer would perceive a significant risk that the 
representation will be materially limited or that the lawyer’s 
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be 
adversely affected . . . by the lawyer’s own financial, business, 
property or personal interests.”186  So long as the arrangement is 
“adverse to the interests or [is] to the disadvantage of present or 
former clients,” the arrangement will be deemed to  impermissibly 
conflict with the interests of the attorney.187 
Even though the Bronx Defenders attorneys are likely interested in 
the continued operation of the Bronx Freedom Fund, there is little 
that suggests that their ability to diligently represent their clients 
would wane.  When an attorney with a pecuniary interest forfeits 
bond, the attorney suffers a tangible financial loss.188  If a client who 
qualifies for assistance from the Fund skips bail, the “loss” is felt by a 
third party who has implicitly agreed not to be reimbursed by 
donating to the Freedom Fund.  Unlike the tangible loss that 
attorneys who post bail surely seek to avoid, the third-party donators 
will not have any indication whether their donation is returned to the 
Freedom Fund or forfeited to the court.  In addition, the Bronx 
Defenders did not have either an express or informal policy in place 
that compelled attorneys to do whatever was necessary to insure that 
 
 184. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *7 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 185. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2009). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Ramon Mullerat, Lawyer’s Conflict of Interest 1, 9 (Nov. 26, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.fbe.org/IMG/pdf/Lawyers_ 
conflicts_of_interest.pdf. 
 188. See generally S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 90-02 (1990). 
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the collateral was returned to the Freedom Fund.189  Without a 
commitment to the third-party donators to make sure that the clients 
attended their court dates, the Bronx Defenders attorneys would not 
be “conflict[ed] between the client’s interests and those of third 
parties to whom the lawyer owes obligations.”190 
Furthermore, if the client’s appearance is absolutely vital to the 
continued operation of the Bronx Freedom Fund, then it is likely that 
the attorney has committed an ethical violation.  A Bronx Defenders 
attorney, for example, might feel compelled to act adversely to her 
client’s interests191 if the provisions governing the Bronx Freedom 
Fund held that once the first client missed her court date, the Fund 
would be shut down.  For the eighteen months that the Freedom 
Fund was operating, however, five percent of the clients subsequently 
failed to make their court date.192  But rather than terminating the 
Freedom Fund or sanctioning the attorneys for recommending a 
client who subsequently failed to appear, the Freedom Fund 
remained in operation.193  This suggests that neither the Bronx 
Defenders attorneys nor Ms. Towns were under any undue pressure 
to make sure that their clients made their court dates.  Similarly, an 
attorney may act unethically if she knew that the Fund was financially 
limited, and thereby needed to reacquire the collateral in order to 
provide bail for future clients.  As of May 2009, however, the Fund 
had over $70,000 available for bail, and there was no indication that 
the Bronx attorneys were compelled to preserve the resources in the 
Fund.194 
Without either a financial relationship between the attorneys and 
their clients, or an express or implied obligation compelling the 
attorneys to ensure that the Fund’s resources were reacquired, the 
Bronx Defenders attorneys were not involved in an arrangement that 
would lead them to act without regard to their clients best interest.195  
It is likely, therefore, that those involved with the Bronx Freedom 
Fund conducted themselves ethically pursuant to Rule 1.7(a)(2). 
 
 189. See generally, People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 
51560(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 190. Mullerat, supra note 187, at 9. 
 191. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). 
 192. See Pringle, supra note 25. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *8. 
 195. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2009). 
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B. Can an Attorney Uphold Her Duty of Confidentiality 
While Serving as Her Client’s Bondsman? 
When a criminal defendant fails to appear, a judge may press the 
defendant’s attorney about why her client did not appear and where 
she is staying.  While the attorney is certainly precluded from making 
knowingly false statements to the judge pursuant to the attorney’s 
duty of candor,196 the attorney must uphold her duty of confidentiality 
to her client even in the wake of the judge’s questioning.197  If a for-
profit bail bondsman posted bail on the defendant’s behalf, the court 
may contact the bondsman and ask for certain information about the 
defendant.198  When a bondsman posts bail for a defendant, she asks 
for personal information that would help locate the defendant in the 
event that she skips bail.199  Because there is no privilege between 
these communications, a bondsman can freely provide this 
information to anyone, including a bounty hunter, a police officer, or 
the court.200  This disclosed information may be helpful to the court 
when deciding whether to issue a warrant or to provide the defendant 
with another opportunity to appear in court.  The information could 
also be helpful to law enforcement, who may be instructed to locate 
the defendant and return her to the state’s custody. 
Attorneys serving as a client’s bondsman, on the other hand, may 
be unable to voluntarily disclose this information to anyone other 
than their agents.201  Generally, information about a client’s 
whereabouts should not be disclosed by a lawyer: “information 
respecting a client’s whereabouts ‘gained in the professional 
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate’ squarely 
falls within the general ethical obligation of preserving the 
confidentiality of client secrets.”202  The court, therefore, may be 
unable to receive information about the client that they normally 
attain from a for-profit bondsman.  As a result, it is necessary to 
determine the breadth of the duty of confidentiality in order to 
 
 196. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 3.3(a) (2013). 
 197. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R .1.6 (2009). 
 198. Tonya Page, What Happens if Someone Fails to Appear in Court?, FAMILY 
BAIL BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.familybailbonds.com/blog/2010/04/what-
happens-if-someone-fails-to-appear-in-court. 
 199. Frequently Asked Questions, ALL COUNTY BAIL BONDS, LLC, 
http://www.bailthejail.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 200. See generally Thomas, supra note 56. 
 201. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 202. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 95-702 (1995). 
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predict whether an attorney can uphold her ethical responsibilities 
under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, while 
also being affiliated to a Fund that posts bail for her clients. 
1. Voluntarily Revealing Information Related to a Client’s 
Whereabouts Under 1.6(a) 
Rule 1.6(a) limits what an attorney may disclose by instructing her 
that she may not reveal confidential information about a client to the 
client’s disadvantage.203  It is “difficult to imagine, [however] a greater 
disadvantage than one’s own attorney playing a significant part in 
returning her to confinement.”204  Not only will the disclosed 
information assist law enforcement in locating the bail skip, but it will 
also likely cause the defendant to relinquish trust in her attorney, and 
potentially even the legal system.205  A client’s sense of fairness is 
compromised when he “senses that his attorney’s loyalties are 
divided” between the client and law enforcement.206  To ensure that 
the legal system has any legitimacy, it is necessary that clients believe 
that they have diligent attorneys on their side who will not leave them 
out to “fend for. . . themselves.”207 
Furthermore, an attorney is precluded from revealing confidential 
information about the client for the advantage of the lawyer or a third 
person.208  When an attorney acts as a client’s bondsman and later 
“submits his affidavit to the court detailing his cause for surrendering 
the principal, he is most likely relying on privileged information he 
acquired in the course of his representation.”209  In doing so, the 
attorney is utilizing the information obtained from the client as a tool 
to better herself.210  In other words, the attorney “has gained the fee 
negotiated at the initial execution of the bail bond and has used the 
protected information to relieve himself of any further liability.”211  
By placing her responsibilities as a bondsman ahead of her duty of 
 
 203. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(a) (2013). 
 204. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 988. 
 205. See id. at 983. 
 206. Timothy Miller, Note, The Attorney’s Duty to Reveal a Client’s Intended 
Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582, 594. 
 207. Id. 
 208. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(a). 
 209. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 989. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. 
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confidentiality to her client, the attorney has likely run afoul of New 
York’s ethical rules. 
Although Rule 1.6(a) seems to preclude both the attorney and her 
agent from voluntarily disclosing the client’s whereabouts, Rule 
1.6(b) carves out exceptions detailing when attorneys can ethically 
breach their duty of confidentiality.212  While there is nothing 
explicitly allowing an attorney to voluntarily disclose confidential 
information about a client who committed bail jumping, there are 
several opinions that highlight the scope of 1.6(b).213 
2. Revealing Information Related to a Client’s Whereabouts Under 
1.6(b) 
An attorney’s duty of confidentiality, which encompasses a client’s 
admission of guilt, does not cover a client’s intention to engage in 
future criminal conduct.214  Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits an attorney to 
reveal his client’s intention to commit a crime so long as the 
disclosure is reasonably related to preventing the crime.215  Because 
bail jumping is a crime under New York Penal Law § 215.57, an 
attorney may reveal her client’s intention to flee if information is 
necessary to help law enforcement prevent the crime.  This is only 
applicable, however, if an attorney is aware of their client’s intention 
to commit the crime.216 
 
 212. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(b).  Rule 1.6(b) provides: 
A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the extent that the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing 
a crime; (3) to withdraw a written or oral opinion or representation 
previously given by the lawyer and reasonably believed by the lawyer still to 
be relied upon by a third person, where the lawyer has discovered that the 
opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate information or 
is being used to further a crime or fraud; (4) to secure legal advice about 
compliance with these Rules or other law by the lawyer, another lawyer 
associated with the lawyer’s firm or the law firm; (5) (i) to defend the lawyer 
or the lawyer’s employees and associates against an accusation of wrongful 
conduct; or (ii) to establish or collect a fee; or (6) when permitted or 
required under these Rules or to comply with other law or court order. 
Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial 
Ethics, Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002); State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995); 
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975). 
 214. Deborah A. Scalise, Attorney Professionalism Forum, 78-Oct. N.Y. ST. B.J. 
50, 51 (2006). 
 215. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(a) cmt. 6C. 
 216. See id. 
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Some jurisdictions broaden the scope of the duty of confidentiality 
by requiring attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of all 
information relating to the representation of their clients even if, 
prior to a client’s court date, an attorney has a strong inclination that 
her client will not appear.217  In Arizona, for example, counsel may 
reveal the intention of a client not to appear only if: “(1) the attorney 
has actual knowledge that the client will not appear; and (2) the act is 
willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence.”218  But because 
“it is very difficult for a lawyer to ‘know’ when such unlawful purpose 
will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of 
mind,” it will be rare that an attorney is sufficiently certain that her 
client intends not to appear.219 
An attorney may, however, ethically breach her duty of 
confidentiality when a client “is continuing an ongoing criminal 
scheme,”220 or is involved in the commission of a crime that is 
“continuing.”221  A “continuing crime” has been explained as “one 
which, though committed in the past has ramifications or effects that 
continue into the future.”222  There is considerable disagreement, 
however, about what constitutes as a “past crime,” as opposed to a 
“continuing” one.223  Some scholars argue that a literal application of 
“continuing crime” “obliterate[s] any meaningful distinction between 
past and future conduct.”224  They insist that some “criminal acts that 
have occurred in the past [can be] given an indefinitely 
contemporaneous aspect by the criminal law.”225  The past offense of 
theft, for example, could easily be portrayed as “possession of stolen 
property,” while escaping from prison becomes the offense of 
“remaining a fugitive.”226  Focusing on the contemporaneous effects 
of past offenses enables attorneys to freely divulge private 
 
 217. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002); see COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(b)(2). 
 221. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975). 
 222. Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A 
“Philosophically Informed” and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177, 243 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 223. Id. at 242–43. 
 224. Id. at 243. 
 225. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002). 
 226. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002); Moore, supra note 222, at 244–45. 
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information about their client’s conduct without any ethical 
restraints.227  “[T]o better accomplish the aims of both the client 
confidentiality provisions in the Code and of protecting innocent 
victims of a client’s criminal conduct,”228 these scholars insist that “the 
mere continuation of the harmful effects of an otherwise completed 
client wrong” does not render a crime as “continuing.”229  Instead, a 
client charged with a crime should be able to freely communicate and 
admit guilt to an attorney without any apprehension that the attorney 
will subsequently reveal that information.230 
Determining whether bail jumping is a “past crime” or a 
“continuing crime” impacts whether an attorney serving as a client’s 
bondsman may freely reveal information related to the crime.  Based 
on the New York City Bar’s commitment to protecting a lawyer’s 
duty of confidentiality,231 it is unlikely that “bail jumping” will be 
deemed a continuous crime.  In fact, the New York City Bar has been 
reluctant to allow attorneys to breach their duty of confidentiality 
even when they have identified a “continuous crime.”232  In 2002, the 
Bar interpreted Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3), which was the 
precursor to Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as 
forbidding attorneys from disclosing information “based on the 
client’s ‘continuous crime’ where the client has already completed 
conduct which satisfies all elements of the crime and has sought to 
engage the lawyer to defend the client against the criminal charges 
relating to that conduct.”233 
In an earlier Opinion, the New York State Bar Association 
Committee on Professional Ethics shed light on what type of crime 
“bail jumping” is likely to be considered.234  The question the 
Committee sought to resolve was whether it was ethical for an 
attorney to reveal the whereabouts of her client after she had missed 
her court date.235  After failing to show up for trial, the defendant sent 
 
 227. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Moore, supra note 222, at 244. 
 230. See generally id. 
 231. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002) (an attorney’s duty of confidentiality is “the bedrock of the 
adversary system”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975). 
 235. Id. 
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her lawyer a letter with information regarding her whereabouts, but 
instructed the attorney to keep the contents of the letter 
confidential.236  As a result, the attorney was left in an ethical bind; 
should she reveal the location of her client, or keep the information 
confidential and uphold her duty of confidentiality?  The Opinion 
directed the attorney to follow a three-step procedure: 
1. He should notify the defendant that he cannot represent him so 
long as he remains a fugitive. He should further urge him to 
surrender to the proper authorities. 
2. He should not voluntarily seek out the public authorities and 
inform them of the address of the defendant. 
3. If a police officer, investigator, or prosecutor should approach the 
attorney for the address of the defendant, he should refrain from 
furnishing this information, which has been vouchsafed to him by 
a client who requested that it be kept confidential.237 
While the Opinion does not unambiguously state that bail jumping 
is a “past crime,” it can be inferred that the Committee did not view 
bail jumping as a “continuous crime.”  Even though the attorney 
became aware that her client had committed bail jumping, the 
Opinion explicitly instructed the attorney that she still could not 
breach her duty of confidentiality to her client.238 
Although doing so less blatantly, the ABA also seems to view bail 
jumping as a “past crime.”  In 1930, the Ethics Committee vowed that 
an attorney is not compelled to reveal the location of a bail skip when 
she acquires knowledge of her client’s whereabouts from confidential 
communications with relatives of the client.239  By determining that 
knowledge of the client’s criminal conduct does not enable the 
attorney to ethically breach her duty of confidentiality, the ABA 
seemed to be inferring that bail jumping is a “past crime.”240 
Furthermore, the ABA withdrew an opinion that required an 
attorney to either relinquish communication with her client, or reveal 
the client’s location if she refused to surrender herself to 
authorities.241  The withdrawn opinion maintained that by 
continuously communicating with her client, the attorney was 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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implicitly encouraging her not to return.242  Although withdrawing the 
opinion does not entail that the ABA now forbids attorneys from 
disclosing confidential information about a client who refuses to 
surrender, it underscores the ABA’s reluctance to explicitly allow 
attorneys to reveal confidential information about a client after they 
know that the client committed bail jumping. 
The above opinions present situations that are distinct from the 
circumstances at play with clients who receive bail assistance from a 
charitable fund, such as the Freedom Fund.  While the attorneys 
above acquired information related to their client’s location from 
either the client herself or from her family members, the charitable 
fund may not have any contact with either the client or someone who 
knows of her whereabouts.  Instead, the Fund might only have the 
information they initially acquired from the client’s attorney, which 
could include details about where the client spends her free time, 
where her family is located, and who to call if she cannot be 
contacted.  But if attorneys are precluded from voluntarily disclosing 
their clients’ whereabouts even when the client reveals her location to 
her attorney, then nothing suggests that an attorney can ethically 
provide personal information about the client when it is merely 
tangentially related to her whereabouts. 
To remit a bail forfeiture in the event of a bail skip, the bondsman 
must, among other things, “expend money and effort in an effort to 
produce the defendant.”243 In an effort to locate the defendant, the 
bondsman may be compelled to reveal the defendant’s private 
information that received when he was hired.244  Because 
communications between a bondsman and their client is not 
privileged, a bondsman can freely disclose the confidential 
information without any ethical constraints.  An attorney, on the 
other hand, is likely precluded from doing so.  Because information 
related to the client’s whereabouts certainly qualifies as confidential 
information pursuant to Rule 1.6,245 and none of the exceptions under 
1.6(b) seem to apply, an attorney who bails out her client is likely 
precluded from revealing confidential information about a client who 
committed bail jumping. 
Although the attorney’s duty of confidentiality makes it unlikely 
that an individual will be able to fully satisfy her obligations as a 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. People v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co. 144 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1955). 
 244. See Page, supra note 198. 
 245. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 702 (1995). 
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bondsman while abiding by her ethical duties as an attorney, a legal 
services organization can implement the charitable fund in a manner 
that easily eliminates the possibility of an ethical violation.  While the 
general rule is that “[A lawyer] may not divulge confidential 
communications, information, and secrets imparted to him by the 
client or acquired during their professional relations,”246 an attorney is 
authorized to reveal her client’s confidential information if the client 
gives her “informed consent.”247  If, at the onset of the representation, 
attorneys were required to receive their client’s permission to breach 
their duty of confidentiality in the event of a bail skip, then legal 
services organizations would avoid the ethical dilemma that the duty 
of confidentiality poses.  The attorney must not merely receive her 
client’s consent, but must also make sure that she “has communicated 
information adequate[ly] . . . [about] the material risks of the 
proposed course of conduct and reasonably available alternatives.”248  
In doing so, the attorney must make sure that her client is not simply 
consenting because of her inherent vulnerability as a recent arrestee.  
If the client freely consents to the disclosure, attorneys and their 
agents will be able to uphold their ethical responsibilities pursuant to 
Rule 1.6, while simultaneously satisfying their obligations as a bail 
bondsman.  Without a procedure in place that ensures that the clients 
have provided their attorneys with authorization to breach their duty 
of confidentiality, legal services organizations may act unethically by 
either implementing a charitable bail fund or working with a 
charitable group that already has one. 
3. Can a Court Compel an Attorney to Reveal Information that 
Would Cause the Attorney to Breach Her Duty of Confidentiality to 
Her Client 
An attorney’s duty to her client is “qualified by [her duty] of 
candor to the court” and “the performance of the attorney’s duty to 
present her client’s case with persuasive force, while maintaining the 
 
 246. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 40-202 (1940). 
 247. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.00 r. 1.6(a)(1) (2013). 
“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed 
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated  information adequate  
for the person to make an informed decision, and after the lawyer has 
adequately explained to the person the material risks of the proposed 
course of conduct and reasonably available alternatives. 
Id. r. 1.0(j). 
 248. Id. r. 1.0(j). 
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confidences of the client, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor 
to the court.”249  Thus, “Rule 3.3(c) makes crystal clear that the 
disclosure duty applies” even when doing so would cause the attorney 
to violate her duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6.250 
It is sometimes difficult to determine, however, when the duty of 
candor applies to an attorney.  Determining precisely when an 
attorney must disclose information to the court is important when 
deciphering if an individual can ethically act as both an individual’s 
attorney and her bondsman.  By compelling lawyers to reveal their 
client’s confidences when the court demands, the attorney’s ability to 
act as a bondsman will not be compromised.  But if the attorney can 
ignore or delay providing this information to a tribunal, the attorney 
might be shunning her responsibilities as a bail bondsman. 
Rule 1.6(b)(6) states that a lawyer may reveal her client’s 
confidential information “when permitted or required under these 
Rules or to comply with other law or court order.”251  New York has 
interpreted “required by law” as applying “only to court orders which 
are not the subject to further review.”252  Although failing to comply 
with a subpoena, for example, can lead to criminal punishment, 
attorneys who receive a subpoena or other formal request are 
precluded in some jurisdictions from revealing their client’s 
confidences or secrets without the client’s consent.253  The Nassau 
County Bar Association stated that in the absence of a court order 
directing the disclosure, an attorney may not breach her duty of 
confidentiality to her client.254 
The New York State Bar Association, on the other hand, did not 
preclude attorneys from disclosing their clients’ confidences upon a 
formal request from the court, but instead provided the attorneys 
with the ability to delay doing so.255  The state held that when “the 
order is subject to good faith challenge, the lawyer should be free to 
postpone giving the court ordered testimony pending appropriate 
review.”256  In doing so, the attorney may move to quash the subpoena 
and inform the court that her ethical duties dictate that she cannot 
 
 249. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 2. 
 250. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 837 (2010). 
 251. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.00 r. 1.6(b)(6). 
 252. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 528 (1981). 
 253. Nassau Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 98-5 (1998). 
 254. Id. 
 255. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 528 (1981). 
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voluntarily reveal the requested information.257  If the court rejects 
the attorney’s motion, and thereby orders the attorney to disclose the 
requested information, the attorney must reveal her client’s 
confidences pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(6).258 
Although Rule 1.6(b)(6) does not explicitly state that an attorney 
must reveal her client’s confidential information after being ordered 
to by the court, Rule 3.4(a)(6) provides that in her representation of a 
client, a lawyer shall not “conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that 
which [he] is required by law to reveal.”259  The Rule thus provides a 
clear responsibility for the attorney to disclose her client’s 
confidences after a final order by the court.  Much like a bail 
bondsman, attorneys working with the Fund and non-legal employees 
of the organization are compelled to reveal private information about 
the defendant upon court order.  If the charitable bail organizations 
comply with the court orders, then the court would not be devoid of 
information they would normally acquire from a non-attorney, for-
profit bondsman. 
Unlike an attorney, however, a bondsman who is subpoenaed 
cannot invoke a privilege to postpone disclosure of the requested 
information.  As a result, there is hardly a delay between when the 
court requests the information and when the bondsman discloses it.  
A court order, though, may require the immediate disclosure of 
certain information to properly serve the needs of the criminal justice 
system.  By delaying the disclosure of their clients’ confidences, the 
attorneys could frustrate the urgent needs of law enforcement.  This 
concern, however, is a criminal justice issue rather than an ethical 
one. 
C. Is Implementing a Charitable Bail Fund Just a Way For 
Legal Services Organizations to Solicit Clients? 
Some may argue that by making it well-known that they will post 
bail for certain clients, organizations like the Bronx Defenders 
improperly solicit clients.  This argument, however, holds no weight.  
First, non-profit legal services organizations, unlike private law firms, 
have no financial incentive to solicit business.  Because the attorneys’ 
salaries are the same regardless of how busy they are, it is not 
 
 257. See, e.g., Answering Your Questions About Legal Ethics, VA. ST. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.vsb.org/profguides/FAQ_leos/LegalEthicsFAQs.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2012). 
 258. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(b)(6) (2013). 
 259. Id. r. 3.4(a)(6). 
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reasonable to view their practice of posting bail for certain clients as a 
means of feeding business into the attorney’s practice.  More 
importantly, the Bronx Defenders’ ability to post bail for their clients 
cannot be viewed as an improper attempt to solicit business because 
defendants cannot simply choose to acquire their services.  Instead, a 
defendant must first be arrested in Bronx County and subsequently 
be assigned to a public defender.260  To be assigned to a public 
defender, the arrestee must first be eligible for one.261  “[E]ligibility 
determination[s] must be made on a case-by-case basis, and therefore 
must not be premised solely on any single factor.”262  Consequently, 
the determination of whether the arrestee can utilize the services of a 
public defender rests with the Court, rather than with the defendant 
herself.  As a result, the practice of providing bail assistance to certain 
clients can hardly be construed as an improper attempt to solicit 
business if the only clients they work with have no say in whether 
they can acquire their services. 
Finally, even if a non-profit legal services organization advertises 
its ability to act as both a client’s attorney and bondsman, which could 
be unethical pursuant to Rule 7.1,263 it would not raise any ethical 
questions.  Advertisement is defined in Rule 1.0(a) of New York’s 
Rules of Professional Conduct as “any public or private 
communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm about 
that lawyer or law firm’s services, the primary purpose of which is for 
the retention of the lawyer or law firm.”264  Non-profit legal services 
organizations, like the Bronx Defenders, however, are not 
compensated based on the amount of work they do.  Furthermore, 
their clients must qualify for their services, as opposed to having the 
ability to hire them.  It is not plausible, therefore, that the 
advertisements would be utilized as a means to acquire clients.  
Instead, the advertisements would likely be used as a means to 
encourage other charitable groups to team-up with legal services 
organizations and fight to abate the vulnerability of indigent 
defendants. 
 
 260. Holistic Defense, Defined, supra note 21. 
 261. PUB. DEF. BACKUP CTR., DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTED 
COUNSEL IN NEW YORK STATE 7–8 (1994), available at http://www.nysda.org/ 
docs/PDFs/Pre2010/%5B335%5D%20Determining%20Eligibility%20for%20Appoi
nted%20Counsel%20in%20NYS%20(NYSDA).pdf. 
 262. Id. at 7. 
 263. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 7.1. 
 264. Id. r. 1.0(a). 
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D. Do Attorneys Provide Improper Financial Assistance to 
Their Clients or Enter into a Business Transaction with 
Them by Agreeing to Work with a Charitable 
Organization that Posts Bail on Their Behalf? 
In People v. Miranda, the Bronx District Attorney argued that the 
Bronx Defenders attorneys improperly provided financial assistance 
to their clients by working with an organization that agreed to post 
bail on their clients’ behalf.265  Although the New York State Bar has 
not directly addressed whether bail is a litigation expense,266 which 
would conclusively answer the question of whether the conduct is 
indeed unethical under Rule 1.8(e), the circumstances dictate that the 
attorneys did not improperly provide financial assistance to their 
clients.  The purpose of Rule 1.8(e) is both to avoid encouraging a 
client to pursue litigation that might not otherwise be brought and to 
avoid giving the “lawyer[] too great a financial stake in the 
litigation.”267  Viewing the bail assistance as improper financial 
assistance ignores what the Rule actually sought to prevent.  First, the 
beneficiaries of the financial assistance are criminal defendants who 
are using the resources from the Fund to avoid pretrial incarceration, 
not pursue litigation.  Second, by relying on private donations to post 
bail for the clients, the Bronx Defenders attorneys did not inherit any 
financial stake in the litigation.  While it seems clear that attorneys do 
not violate 1.8(e) by working with a charitable organization that posts 
bail for its clients, another related concern is whether attorneys enter 
into a “business transaction” pursuant to Rule 1.8(a) by agreeing to 
provide bail assistance to certain clients. 
Ethics opinions that address whether an attorney enters a business 
transaction when she agrees to serve as her client’s bondsman have 
focused on the attorney’s inherent advantage in bargaining power.  
The State Bar of Texas, for example, stated that an attorney enters 
into an improper business transaction with her client when the 
attorney posts bail for her client, but is authorized to plead “no 
contest” on behalf of the client if she fails to appear.268  Because the 
“added provision is of no benefit to the client but has [instead] been 
added by the lawyer solely to protect the financial interest of the 
 
 265. People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *16–17 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 266. See, e.g., COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.00. 
 267. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 10 (2009). 
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lawyer,” the terms of the agreement are not “fair and reasonable” to 
the client.”269  Similarly, the Virginia Bar Association held that “loans 
made to clients for assistance with living expenses during the course 
of litigation constitute the lawyer’s entering into . . . a business 
transaction that would allow his professional judgment to be affected 
by his own financial interest.”270  But even though this was deemed an 
improper business transaction, the attorney could advise his clients 
“of the potential conflicts of interest,” and ethically enter into the 
agreement “provided that the transaction is not unconscionable, 
unfair or inequitable when made.”271  Thus, it is essential to examine 
both the conduct of the defense attorneys and their relationship with 
their clients when determining if the attorneys entered into an 
improper business transaction pursuant to Rule 1.8(a). 
Unlike the attorneys in the ethics opinions above, Ms. Towns of the 
Bronx Freedom Fund did not enter into a business transaction with 
the Bronx Defenders clients.  First, the clients who received bail 
assistance did not purchase anything from the attorney or her agent; 
rather than purchasing a bail bond from an attorney, the clients 
simply received bail assistance because their file dictated that they 
were not flight risks.  Moreover, the prospect of being bailed out by 
the Freedom Fund was available to all Bronx Defenders clients so 
long as their attorneys referred their file to Ms. Towns for review.272  
In that regard, it could be viewed as just a “standard transaction”273 
between the Bronx Defenders and its clients.  Finally, Ms. Towns did 
not capitalize on any inherent advantage in bargaining power over 
her client.  Not only did Ms. Towns not acquire anything from the 
clients, but she did not even communicate with them when deciding 
whether to post bail on their behalf.274  Instead, she relied on 
information provided to her by the client’s attorney.275 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill “takes an important step 
toward leveling the playing field for working people and creating a 
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more just bail system,”276 the practice that the Bill seeks to promote 
will soon be halted if the New York State Bar deems such conduct to 
be unethical.  Consequently, this Note set out to anticipate and 
resolve the potential ethical concerns that will arise once charitable 
bail funds, like the Freedom Fund, are implemented.  In doing so, it 
becomes clear that legal services organizations can satisfy their ethical 
duties as attorneys even after teaming-up with charitable groups who 
serve as bondsmen for their clients. 
First, without either a pecuniary or otherwise personal interest at 
stake, the Bronx Defenders attorneys and Ms. Towns did not violate 
Rule 1.7(a).277  If legal services organizations, however, are not careful 
about how they implement a bail fund, there is a risk that a conflict of 
interest will arise.  To avoid such conflicts of interest, it is necessary to 
make sure that there is no policy in place sanctioning attorneys who 
recommend a client who ultimately fails to appear.278  If such a policy 
exists, an attorney’s ability to represent her client could be 
compromised by the attorney’s desire to avoid monetary sanctions or 
other forms of punishment.  Furthermore, to make sure that attorneys 
are not disproportionately motivated to preserve the resources of the 
Fund for future clients, there should be a considerable amount of 
money already invested in the Fund before it begins providing bail 
assistance to criminal defendants.279 
Moreover, the implementation of the Bronx Freedom Fund can 
hardly be construed as an attempt by the Bronx Defenders to 
improperly solicit clients.280  Similarly, the attorneys will not run afoul 
of Rule 1.8(e) by improperly providing financial assistance to a client, 
or 1.8(a) by entering into a “business transaction” with the client, so 
long as the attorneys and the non-legal staff are neither capitalizing 
on any inherent advantage over the clients, nor disproportionately 
benefiting from the agreement.281 
There are clearly circumstances, however, where the attorney or 
her agent must abandon her ethical responsibilities in order to satisfy 
the obligations of a bail bondsman.282  Attorneys working with 
charitable bail funds, for example, may be unable to uphold their 
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commitment to protecting their client’s confidentiality while faithfully 
fulfilling the responsibilities of a bondsman.  This situation leaves the 
attorney turned bondsman in an ethical quagmire: should she breach 
her duty of confidentiality to her client and voluntarily disclose 
information related to her whereabouts, or should her commitment to 
her client supersede her responsibilities as a bondsman? 
Fortunately, legal services organizations can circumvent the 
challenges that the duty of confidentiality poses.  If at the onset of the 
representation attorneys are required to get their clients’ “informed 
consent” to breach the duty of confidentiality in the event of a bail 
skip, then they will be able to satisfy their obligations as their clients’ 
bondsmen while fulfilling their ethical responsibilities as attorneys.283 
If implemented correctly, charitable bail funds can help reduce the 
pervasiveness of pretrial incarceration for poor and indigent 
defendants.  Ever since Tocqueville first visited America, the country 
has struggled to foster judicial parity for indigent criminal defendants.  
While the battle for promoting equity for indigent defendants is 
certainly far from over, the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill should serve as 
a good first-step in ameliorating their inherent vulnerability. 
 
 283. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
